Offense or Defense: Alexander Must Decide!
A War and Peace Slow-Read Resource
“… at first the tsar dreamed of leading an offensive war but then ran up against the procrastination of Prussia as well as doubts about Polish cooperation….” “So eventually Alexander decided on a firmly defensive war.” [1, Chap. 10, “Between Domestic Reforms and Military Preparations, 1807-1812”]
January 1810: Barclay de Tolly appointed War Minister. He is assisted by Prince Peter Volkonsky, Director of the Supply Corps. [ibid]
Early 1810: Barclay sends a memorandum to Alexander entitled “The Defense of Russia’s Western Frontiers.” In this, he describes the western Russian border as “enormously long, “ and as “poorly defended by man or nature.” [2, Chap. 4, “Preparing for War”]
February-March 1810: Barclay proposed a plan to reinforce the western border and to make Dnvina-Dnieper the principle line of defense. He also recommended two divisions and two forts be deployed in Finland to avoid an attack there by Sweden. [ibid]
August 1810: Barclay proposed peace with the Ottoman Empire so the Russian forces there could be redeployed to the western border. In May 1812 Alexander made the Peace of Bucharest for this purpose. [ibid]
Summer 1811: Alexander decides on a defensive strategy. In August 1811, he told the Austrian Minister, “If attacked, he would retreat into his empire, turning the area he abandoned into a desert.” [2, Chap. 3, “The Russo-French Alliance”]
March 1812: Alexander appoints Count Rostopchin as Governor-General of Moscow. [ibid]
March 29, 1812: Alexander relieves Speransky of his duties accusing him of treason on behalf of Napoleon.[ibid]
April 26, 1812: Alexander is in Vilnius with his soldiers.[ibid]
“… Everything opposed them to each other: rhetoric, ideology, objectives, means and strategy.” [1, Chap. 11, “The Duel of the Emperors”]
Barclay and Phul had similar thoughts: [ibid]
Retreat to Drissa on the Dvina River.
Entice Napoleon to follow, lengthening his supply chains, further weakening his army.
Once Napoleon reached Drissa, the First Western Army led by Barclay would attack.
The Second Western Army led by Bagration would attack Naploeon laterally.
Bagration, to whom retreat was morally repugnant, and Ermelon did not agree with Barclay and Puhl.[ibid]
June 23, 1812: A party was held for Alexander at Bennigsen’s estate near Vilnius. There General Balashov informed Alexander that Napoleon had crossed the Niemen River with 480.000 troops.[ibid]
Troops available to Alexander at this point: [ibid]
First Western Army: 120, 210 troops
Second Western Amy: 49, 423 troops
Third Western Army: 44,180 troops
Additional troops available:
The second line behind these armies: 100,000 troops
The Finnish Corp of 51,526 troops
The Army of the Danube: 108, 000 troops
Cossacks and there irregulars
Total available: 716, 000 troops
Despite these troop numbers, Alexander’s Russian Army had one chief structural problem; his high command lacked cohesion. As Napoleon remarked to Balashov, “While Phul prepares, Armfeld contradicts, Bennigsen examines, and Barclay on who the execution rests, does not know what to conclude.” [ibid]
On June 27, 1812 at 3 AM, Alexander and his staff abandon Vilnius. Napoleon arrives there the next day. [ibid]
August 1812: Alexander tells a Finnish official that strategy requires that Napoleon need to appear to be the aggressor and must invade Russian territory. This will help rally the Russia population to the cause. [2, Chap. 4, “Preparing for War”]
Further Reading:
1] Alexander I: The Tsar Who Defeated Napoleon by Marie-Pierre Rey, 2012
2] Russia Against Napoleon: The True Story of the Campaigns of ‘War and Peace’ by Dominic Lieven, 2009